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Technology consists of society's pool of knowledge concerning the in-
dustrial, agricultural, and medical arts. It is made up of knowledge
concerning physical and social phenomena, knowledge regarding the
application of basic principles to work in the relevant fields or pro-
fessions, and knowledge of the rules of thumb of practitioners and
craftsmen. Although the distinction between science and technology is
imprecise, it is important. Science is aimed at understanding, whereas
technology is aimed at use. At the outset, it is worth noting that changes
in technology often take place as a consequence of inventions that de-
pend on no new scientific principles. Indeed, until the middle of the
nineteenth century, there was only a loose connection between science
and technology.
The fundamental and widespread effects of technological change are
obvious. Technological change has permitted the reduction of working
hours, improved working conditions, provided a wide variety of extraor-
dinary new products, increased the flow of old products and added a
great many dimensions to the life of our citizens. Its contribution to
American economic growth has been very important, as evidenced by
Denison's (1962) estimate that about 40 percent of the total increase
in national income per person employed during 1929-57 was due to
"advance of knowledge."
Edwin Mansfield is professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania.
My thanks go to Zvi Griliches and Richard Nelson, who commented on a pre-
liminary draft of this paper.
563564 Edwin Mansfield/Ruben F. Mettler/David Packard
At the same time, technological change also has its darker side. Ad-
vances in military technology have enabled modern nation-states to
cause human destruction on an unprecedented scale; modern technology
has contributed to various kinds of air and water pollution; and advances
in industrial technology have sometimes resulted in widespread unem-
ployment in particular occupations and communities. Despite the many
benefits that society has reaped from technological change, no one would
regard it as an unalloyed blessing. (For example, see National Commis-
sion on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress [1966].)
8.2 Productivity Growth in the United States
Economists and policy makers have long been interested in produc-
tivity—the ratio of output to input. The simplest measure of productivity
is output per hour of labor, often called labor productivity. Clearly,
changes in labor productivity are of fundamental significance, since they
are intimately related to, but by no means synonymous with, changes in
a country's standard of living. The rate of technological change is one
determinant of the rate of growth of labor productivity. Other important
determinants of the rate of labor productivity growth are the extent to
which capital is substituted for labor, economies of scale, changes in the
utilization of productive capacity, and changes in the rate of diffusion of
new techniques.
A somewhat more complicated measure of productivity is the total
productivity index, which has the advantage that it takes account of both
capital and labor inputs. Specifically, this index equals q 4- {zl + vk),
where q is output (as a percentage of output in some base period), / is
labor input (as a percentage of labor input in some base period), k is
capital input (as a percentage of capital input in some base period), z
is labor's share of the value of output in the base period, and v is cap-
ital's share of the value of the output in the base period. Substituting
values of q, I, and k over a given period into this formula, one can easily
calculate the value of the index for that period.
Labor productivity in the United States has not increased at a constant
rate. The rate of growth of output per man-hour was significantly higher
after World War I than before and significantly higher after World War
II than before. Specifically, based on Kendrick's (1976) figures, the
trend rate of growth of real output per man-hour was almost 2.5 percent
for the three decades prior to 1948 (after adjustment for the effect of
the Great Depression), as compared with over 3 percent from 1948 to
1973. This increase in the rate of growth of labor productivity seems
to have been due to a faster increase in real capital per man-hour during
1948-73 than during 1919-48.565 Technology and Productivity in the United States
During 1966-79, however, there was a notable slowdown in the rate
of increase of both output per man-hour and total productivity. Table
8.1 compares the rate of increase of productivity between 1966 and
1973 (both business-cycle peaks) with that during 1948-66. Output
per man-hour increased by about 2.3 percent per year during 1966-73,
as compared with 3.4 percent per year during 1948-66. Total produc-
tivity increased by less than 2 percent per year during 1966-73, as com-
pared with 2.5 percent per year during 1948-66. In most industry
divisions (and particularly in electric and gas utilities), there was a fall
in the rate of increase of output per man-hour.
Since 1973 the rate of productivity increase in the United States has
been even lower than during 1966-73. According to the Council of
Economic Advisers (1979), output per man-hour increased by 1.0 per-
cent during 1973-77, as compared with 2.3 percent during 1965-73.
And between 1977 and 1978, it increased by only 0.4 percent. Accord-
ing to unpublished data that John Kendrick has made available to me,
total productivity in manufacturing fell sharply from 1973 to 1974 and
was only slightly higher in 1975 than in 1974. By 1976 it was not much
above its 1973 value.
Table 8.1 Productivity Trends in the United States Private Domestic
Economy, 1948-73
Total Productivity
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What factors are responsible for this significant slackening of United
States productivity growth? According to Kutscher, Mark, and Nors-
worthy (1977) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, one of the major
factors has been the increase in the proportion of youths and women in
the labor force. Output per man-hour tends to be relatively low among
women and among new entrants into the labor force. During the late
1960s, women and new entrants increased as a proportion of the labor
force. Based on the Bureau's calculations, this change in labor force
composition may have been responsible for 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points
of the difference between the average rate of productivity increase in
1947-66 and that in 1966-73. George Perry (1971), in his analysis of
the causes of the slowdown, agrees that this factor was important.
A second factor that has been cited in this regard is the rate of growth
of the capital-labor ratio. During 1948-73, relatively high rates of pri-
vate investment resulted in a growth of the capital-labor ratio (net non-
residential capital stock divided by aggregate hours worked in the private
nonfarm sector) of almost 3 percent per year. After 1973, relatively
low rates of investment resulted in the growth of the capital-labor ratio
by only about 1.75 percent per year. According to the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers (1979), this reduction in the rate of growth of the
capital-labor ratio may have reduced the rate of productivity increase
by up to 0.5 percentage points per year. Christensen, Cummings, and
Jorgensen (forthcoming), in their study of this topic, also emphasize
the decrease in the rate of growth of the capital-labor ratio.
A third factor that has been cited in this regard is increased govern-
ment regulation. A variety of new types of environmental, health, and
safety regulations have been adopted in recent years. Because reduced
pollution, enhanced safety, and better health are generally not included
in measured output, the use of more of society's resources to meet these
regulations is likely to result in a reduction in measured productivity
growth. Also, the litigation and uncertainty associated with new regula-
tions may discourage investment and efficiency, and the form of the
regulations sometimes may inhibit socially desirable adaptations by
firms. According to the Council of Economic Advisers (1979), the
direct costs of compliance with environmental health and safety regula-
tions may have reduced the growth of productivity by about 0.4 per-
centage points per year since 1973.
A fourth factor, cited by John Kendrick (1976) and others, is the
reduction in the rate of increase of intangible capital due to the decrease
in the proportion of gross national product devoted to research and
development (R & D) during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In section
8.3 of this paper, we shall look closely at the changes over time in the
level of R & D expenditures in the United States. For now, it is enough
to say that United States R & D expenditures decreased, as a percentage567 Technology and Productivity in the United States
of gross national product, from 3.0 percent in 1964 to 2.2 percent in
1978.
A fifth factor, cited by William Nordhaus (1972) and others, is the
shift of national output toward services and away from goods. However,
there is considerable disagreement over whether this shift in the compo-
sition of national output is responsible for much of the productivity
slowdown. Michael Grossman and Victor Fuchs (1973), among others,
are skeptical of this proposition.
Edward Denison (1978b) has carried out a particularly detailed in-
vestigation of the causes of the productivity slowdown. Table 8.2 shows
his estimates of the sources of the growth of national income per person
employed (NIPPE). According to these estimates, the advance of knowl-
edge was responsible for 1.4 percentage points of the annual growth rate
of NIPPE during 1948-69, and 1.6 percentage points of the annual
growth rate of NIPPE during 1969-73. The effects of other factors,
such as changes in the characteristics of the labor force, changes in
Table 8.2 Sources of Growth of National Income per Person Employed,
Nonresidential Business Sector
Item
Growth Rate of NIPPE
Effect of Irregular Factors
Adjusted Growth Rate









Improved Allocation of Resources*
1
Changes in Legal and Human
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Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.
aIncludes only gains due to the reallocation of labor out of farming and out of
self-employment in small nonfarm enterprises.
bIncludes only effects on output per unit of input of costs incurred to protect the
physical environment and the safety and health of workers, and of costs of crime
and dishonesty.568 Edwin Mansfield/Ruben F. Mettler/David Packard
capital and land per person employed, and economies of scale, are also
estimated in table 8.2.
According to Denison, there was a sharp decline in NIPPE during
1974 and 1975. Such declines were without precedent in the period since
World War II. Because of them, the 1973-76 rate of growth of NIPPE
was negative (—0.5 percent). When the 1948-69 period is compared
with the 1973-76 period, the adjusted rate of growth of NIPPE fell by
3.3 percentage points (from 2.7 percent to —0.6 percent). Denison's
findings indicate that 0.4 percentage points of this decline were due to
the use of more resources to meet pollution, safety, and health regula-
tions (and to prevent crime). Another 1.2 percentage points of this
decline were attributable to six factors: (1) a steeper drop in working
hours, (2) an accelerated shift in the age-sex composition of employed
labor, (3) a slower growth of fixed capital per worker, (4) a slower
growth of inventories per worker, (5) reduced gain from resource real-
location, and (6) reduced gain from economies of scale. Of course,
many of these factors have already been cited in earlier paragraphs of
this section.
Denison concludes that 2.1 percentage points of the 3.3 point drop
in the growth rate of NIPPE remain in the residual called "advances in
knowledge and not elsewhere classified." To some extent, this may be
due to a slowdown in the rate of technological change and in the rate
of innovation. Much more will be said on this score in later sections of
this paper. Also, the fact that 1974 and 1975 were the years when big
oil price hikes first took effect suggests that their effects may be reflected
in the residual. Some observers attribute a substantial proportion of the
drop in the rate of productivity increase to the quadrupling of oil prices.
Others, like Denison, do not seem to believe that this factor can explain
a substantial portion of the decline in the growth rate of NIPPE. The
truth is that there is considerable uncertainty regarding the contribution
of various factors to the observed productivity slowdown.
8.3 Research and Development
Research and development, as defined by the National Science Foun-
dation, includes activities of three kinds. First, there is basic research,
which is "original investigation for the advancement of scientific knowl-
edge . . . which dofes] not have immediate commercial objectives."
1 For
example, an economist who constructs an econometric model, without
any particular application in mind, is performing basic research. Firms
carry out some basic research, but it is a small percentage of their R & D
work. Second, there is applied research, which is research that is aimed
at a specific practical payoff. For example, a project designed to deter-
mine the properties of a new polymer that a chemical firm plans to569 Technology and Productivity in the United States
introduce would be applied research. The dividing line between basic
and applied research is unclear at best. The distinction is based on the
purpose of the project, applied research being done to promote specific
practical and commercial aims, basic research being done to obtain new
knowledge for its own sake.
Finally, there is development, which tries to reduce research findings
to practice. Major development projects attempt to bring into being
entirely new processes and products. Minor development projects at-
tempt to make slight modifications of existing processes and products.
Frequently, prototypes must be designed and constructed or pilot plants
must be built. The dividing line between research and development often
is hazy. Research is oriented toward the pursuit of new knowledge,
whereas development is oriented toward the capacity to produce a par-
ticular product. The outcome of research is generally more uncertain
than the outcome of development. Nonetheless, in development there
often is considerable uncertainty regarding cost, time, and the profitabil-
ity of the result.
To estimate the effects on aggregate output or productivity of the
aggregate amount spent on R & D, economists have used econometric
techniques to estimate the relationship between output, on the one hand,
and labor, capital, and R & D, on the other. Results obtained during the
1960s provide reasonably persuasive evidence that R&D has had a
significant effect on the rate of productivity increase in the industries
that have been studied. Minasian (1969) and Mansfield (1968a) found
that, in chemicals and petroleum, a firm's rate of productivity growth
was directly related to its expenditures on R&D. Minasian's results
indicated about a 50 percent marginal rate of return from R & D in
chemicals. Mansfield's results indicated that the marginal rate of return
from R&D was about 40 percent or more in the oil industry, and about
30 percent in chemicals if technical change was capital embodied (but
much less if it was disembodied). In agriculture, Griliches (1964) found
that, holding other inputs constant, output was related in a statistically
significant way to the amount spent on research and extension. Evenson
(1968), using time series data, estimated the marginal rate of return
from agricultural R & D at about 57 percent.
More recently, Griliches (forthcoming), using data for almost nine
hundred manufacturing firms, found that the amount spent by a firm on
R&D was directly related to its rate of productivity growth. The private
rate of return from R&D was about 17 percent (higher in chemicals
and petroleum, lower in aircraft and electrical equipment). Terleckyj's
(1974) findings suggest about a 30 percent rate of return from an in-
dustry's R&D based only on the effects on its own productivity. Also,
his results show a very substantial effect of an industry's R & D on pro-
ductivity growth in other industries. This, of course, is eminently reason-570 Edwin Mansfield/Ruben F. Mettler/David Packard
able since one industry's R & D often results in improved machines and
inputs to be used by other industries.
Mansfield (1980) found that there is a direct relationship between
the amount of basic research carried out by an industry or firm and its
rate of productivity increase when its expenditures on applied R&D
are held constant. Whether the relevant distinction is between basic and
applied research is by no means clear: basic research may be acting to
some extent as a proxy for long-term R&D. Holding constant the
amount spent on applied R&D and basic research, an industry's rate
of productivity increase during 1948-66 seemed to be directly related
to the extent to which its R & D was long term.
2
The National Science Foundation has published data for many years
concerning the amount spent by industry, government, universities, and
others on research and development. Table 8.3 shows total R&D ex-
penditures in the United States from 1953 to 1979. Clearly, R&D ex-
penditures grew very rapidly in the 1950s and early 1960s. In 1953
total R&D spending was about $5 billion, or about 1.4 percent of gross
national product. By 1964 total R&D spending was about $19 billion,
or about 3.0 percent of gross national product. Industry, impressed by
the wartime accomplishments of science and technology, increased its
R&D spending greatly. So did the federal government, which poured
particularly large sums into defense and space R&D.
Table 8.3 Expenditures on Research and Development, United States,





















































































Source: National Science Foundation 1976; 1977; 1979a.
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The industries that were the leading performers of R & D were air-
craft and missiles, electrical equipment, chemicals, motor vehicles, and
machinery. These industries accounted for over 80 percent of all R & D
performed by industry in 1960, and they continued to do so in 1974.
However, it is important to recognize that much of the R & D they per-
formed was (and is) financed by the federal government. During 1964
the government financed about 90 percent of the R & D in the aircraft
industry, about 60 percent of the R & D in the electrical equipment in-
dustry, about 25 percent of the R & D in the machinery and motor ve-
hicles industries, and about 20 percent of the R&D in the chemical
industry. Table 8.4 shows the intersectoral transfer of funds for R&D
in 1976.
In the late 1960s, due partly to the tightening of federal fiscal con-
straints caused by the Vietnam War, federal expenditures on R & D (in
1972 dollars) decreased. From $18.2 billion in 1967, theyfell to $14.5
billion in 1974. Much of this reduction was due to the winding down of
the space program and the reduction (in constant dollars) of defense
R&D expenditures. During 1975-78, there once again were increases
in constant dollars in federal R&D expenditures. The biggest percent-
age increase occurred in expenditures for energy R&D, which increased
(in current dollars) from $1.2 billion in 1975 to $2.9 billion in 1978.
Industry's expenditures on R&D (in 1972 dollars) increased during
1967-78 but at a much slower rate than in 1960-67. In 1960, indus-
try's R&D expenditures (in 1972 dollars) were $6.6 billion; in 1967,
Table 8.4 Intersectoral Transfers of Funds for Research and Development,
United States, 1976 (Billions of Dollars)
Performers
Federal Universities Other
Sources Govern- Indus- and Nonprofit
of Funds ment try Colleges FFRDCs
a Institutions Total
Federal Government 5.6 10.2 2.5 1.1
Industry — 16.3 0.1 —
Universities and
Colleges — — 0.8 —
Other Nonprofit
Institutions — — 0.3 —
Total 5.6 26.5 3.7 1.1
Source: National Science Foundation 1976.
aFederally funded research and development centers. These are organizations ex-
clusively or substantially financed by the federal government to meet a particular
requirement or to provide major facilities for research and training purposes. Those
that are administered by industry (such as Oak Ridge National Laboratory or
Sandia Laboratory) or nonprofit institutions (such as the Rand Corporation) are
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they were $10.3 billion; in 1978, they were $14.1 billion. The slower
rate of increase since 1967 may have reflected a stabilization or decline
of the profitability of R & D. In the chemical and petroleum industries,
Mansfield's (1979) results suggest such a change in the profitability of
R & D. Also, Beardsley and Mansfield (1978) found, in a study of one
of the nation's largest firms, that the private rate of return from its in-
vestments in new technology tended to be lower during the late 1960s
and early 1970s than during the early 1960s.
The nation's total R & D expenditures (including government, indus-
try, and others), when inflation is taken into account, remained essen-
tially constant from 1966 to 1977. The constant dollar figures are very
crude, since the National Science Foundation uses the GNP deflator to
deflate R & D expenditures. But it seems to be generally accepted that
no appreciable increase in real R&D expenditures took place during
this period. As a percentage of gross national product, R&D expendi-
tures fell from about 3.0 percent in 1964 to about 2.2 percent in 1978.
This decline occurred almost continuously from 1964 to 1978, each
year's percentage generally being lower than the previous year's.
Besides declining as a percentage of gross national product, R&D
expenditures seem to have changed in character during the late 1960s
and the 1970s. Mansfield (1979), in a survey of over one hundred firms
accounting for about one-half of all industrial R&D expenditures in the
United States, found that the proportion of company financed R&D
expenditures devoted to basic research declined between 1967 and 1977
in practically every industry (Nason, Steger, and Manners 1978 came
to essentially the same conclusion). In the sample as a whole, the pro-
portion fell about one-fourth, from 5.6 percent in 1967 to 4.1 percent
in 1977.
In four-fifths of the industries, based on a rough measure of the
perceived riskiness of projects, there was also a decline between 1967
and 1977 in the proportion of R & D expenditures devoted to relatively
risky projects. In metals, chemicals, aircraft, drugs, and rubber this re-
duction was quite large. In some industries, such as aircraft, chemicals,
metals, and rubber there was also a substantial decline in the proportion
of R & D expenditures devoted to relatively long-term projects. But in
other industries, such as drugs, there was an increase in this proportion.
When asked why they reduced the proportion of their R&D expendi-
tures going for basic research and relatively risky projects, the reason
most frequently given by the firms was the increase in government regu-
lations, which they felt had reduced the profitability of such projects.
Another reason was that breakthroughs were more difficult to achieve
than in the past, because the field has been more thoroughly worked
over. Still another reason, emphasized by Nason, Steger, and Manners
(1978), is that management has changed its view of how R&D should573 Technology and Productivity in the United States
be managed. In the 1950s and early 1960s, firms frequently did not try
to manage R & D in much detail. When some of the results turned out
to be disappointing, many firms began to emphasize control, formality
in R & D project selection, and short-term effects on profit. The shift in
emphasis has tended to reduce the proportion of R & D expenditures
going for basic and risky projects. Although there is general agreement
that a greater emphasis on detailed management was justified, many
observers wonder whether the pendulum may have swung too far.
8.4 Scientific and Engineering Personnel
Engineers and scientists, although they are by no means the sole
source of advances in technology, play an important role in bringing
about such advances and in fostering their utilization and acceptance.
Since World War II, there have been three quite distinct* periods with
regard to the employment of engineers and scientists. The first period,
from about 1950 to 1963, was marked by rapid growth of jobs for
engineers and scientists. As shown in table 8.5, the employment of
engineers and scientists grew by over 6 percent per year, which was far
in excess of the rate of growth of total nonfarm employment. In part,
this rapid increase was due to increases in defense activities and in the
space program. During this period there were many complaints of a
shortage of engineers (see Cain, Freeman, and Hansen 1973 and Han-
sen 1967).
The second period, from about 1963 to 1970, saw the employment of
engineers and scientists grow at about the same rate as total nonfarm
employment. The employment of scientists grew more rapidly than the
employment of engineers, because there was a relatively rapid increase
in college enrollments and research programs. The relatively slow rate
of increase of engineering employment reflected cutbacks in defense
programs and space exploration, among other things.
The third period, from about 1970 to 1974, was marked by a very
slow growth of scientific and engineering employment. Whereas total
Table 8.5 Average Annual Percentage Change in Scientific, Engineering,
and Total Nonfarm Employment, 1950-63, 1963-70, and
1970-74
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nonfarm employment grew by 2.5 percent per year, the employment of
engineers and scientists grew by 0.7 percent per year. (Indeed, between
1970 and 1972, there was a decline of twenty thousand persons in en-
gineering employment.) In considerable part, this was due to a slower
growth (or curtailment) of college enrollment, R & D expenditures, and
defense activities—particularly in aircraft and related products.
Unemployment rates for scientists and engineers have tended to be
very low. During the 1960s, the unemployment rate for these workers
was below 1 percent. But in 1971, due partly to the cutbacks in defense
spending and some R & D programs, the unemployment rate for scien-
tists and engineers rose to about 3 percent. By 1973, it fell below 1
percent once again. However, in 1975, the unemployment rate for en-
gineers increased to 2.6 percent, due to the recession.
Most engineers and scientists are employed by industry. Over one
million were employed in the industrial sector in the mid-1970s, as
compared with about three-hundred thousand in universities and col-
leges,and about two-hundred thousand in the federal government. Table
8.6 shows the allocation of industry's labor force among various work
activities. About 37 percent of the scientists and 26 percent of the en-
gineers are involved in R & D or R & D management. However, this does
not mean that the others do not play an important role in the process
by which technology is developed and applied. The interface between
R & D and the rest of the firm is of fundamental importance in deter-
mining the rate of innovation, as Freeman (1974), Mansfield et al.
(1977a), and others have indicated. Production engineers, sales engi-
neers, and other non-R & D engineers and scientists play a significant
part in the innovation process.
An important characteristic of the nation's engineers is their age.
Many studies suggest that engineers, particularly those engaged in re-
search and development, tend to experience a reduction in creativity
Table 8.6 Percentage Distribution of Industry's Scientific and Engineering
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after the age of thirty-five or forty, due in part to obsolescence of knowl-
edge. Given the slowdown in the rate of growth of the engineering labor
force, one would expect that the proportion of engineers that are young
has declined. To see how big this decline has been, Brach and Mansfield
(1979) obtained detailed data from six major firms in the aerospace,
chemical, and petroleum industries. The results show that the percentage
of engineers under thirty-four years decreased from 51 percent in 1960
to 30 percent in 1974, and that the percentage under forty-three years
decreased from 78 percent in 1960 to 56 percent in 1974. When the
sample was expanded to include eighteen firms in the aerospace, elec-
tronics, chemical, and petroleum industries, similar results were ob-
tained. If, as some claim, the rate of innovation in the United States has
been slowing down, it is conceivable that this "graying" of industry's
engineers may be partly responsible.
Given the slowdown in the demand for engineers, it is not surprising
that the percentage of bachelor's (and first professional) degrees awarded
in engineering declined continually and significantly between 1960 and
1975. In 1960, engineering degrees were 10 percent of the total; in
1975, they were 4 percent of the total. The percentage of bachelor's
(and first professional) degrees in the physical and environmental sci-
ences fell from 4 percent in 1960 to 2 percent in 1975. (In contrast, the
percentage in the social sciences increased from 8 percent in 1960 to 14
percent in 1975.) Turning from undergraduates to graduate students,
enrollments for advanced degrees in science and engineering decreased
from 38 percent of all advanced degree enrollment in 1960 to 25 per-
cent in 1975. And according to the National Science Foundation
(1979c), a sizable proportion of the doctoral labor force in science and
engineering may have to obtain jobs outside science and engineering in
1982 and 1987.
8.5 Patents and Innovations
The number of patents is sometimes used as a crude index of the rate
of invention in a given field during a particular period of time. Used in
this way, patent statistics have important disadvantages. For one thing,
the average importance of the patents granted at one time and place may
differ from those granted at another time and place. For another, the
proportion of the total inventions that are patented may vary signifi-
cantly. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile examing the patent statistics at least
briefly.
Table 8.7 shows the changes over time in the number of United States
patents granted. The number of patents granted to United States resi-
dents rose during the 1960s, reached a peak in 1971, and was about 20












United States Patents Granted
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product field, the results are much the same. For example, the number
of patents on electrical equipment, instruments, and communication
equipment all reach a peak in 1971. In some product fields, such as
machinery and fabricated metals, the peak is reached in the late 1960s.
In chemicals, it is reached in 1972. One problem with the data in table
8.7 is that they are influenced by changes over time in how rapidly
patent applications are processed.
The number of patents granted is a measure of inventive activity in a
previous period, since roughly two years are taken by the Patent Office
to process and examine a patent application. To correct for this, table
8.8 shows the number of patents by year of application. There is much
less year-to-year fluctuation in the number of patents when application
dates rather than grant dates are used. And, as would be expected, the
peak patenting rate now occurs in 1969 rather than 1971. When the
data are broken down by product field, the results are surprisingly uni-
form. In machinery, fabricated metals, and electrical equipment, the
peak is in 1966; in communication equipment and chemicals, it is in
1969; and. in instruments, it is in 1971. In practically all of the fifty-two
product fields for which data are available, the patent rate declined
during the 1970s. The only exceptions are in drugs, agricultural chem-
icals, and motorcycles, bicycles, and parts.
From the economist's point of view, innovation is often more relevant
than invention. Innovation is generally defined as the first commercial
introduction of a new or improved process or product. The rate of inno-
vation depends heavily on the quality of a nation's industrial managers
and the way its firms and industries are organized, as well as on the tax
laws, regulatory considerations, and a host of other factors influencing
the profitability and riskiness of innovative activity. Successful innova-
tion requires a great deal more than the establishment of an R & D labo-577 Technology and Productivity in the United States
ratory that turns out a lot of good technical output. In many industries,
the bulk of the innovations are not based to any significant extent on
the firms' R & D. And even in those industries where R & D is important,
one of the crucial problems is to effect a proper coupling between R & D,
on the one hand, and marketing and production, on the other. Unless
this coupling is effective, R & D can be of little use.
To measure the rate of innovation, counts have sometimes been made
of the number of major new processes or products introduced in par-
ticular periods of time. For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, the
number of new chemical entities per year is often used for this purpose.
Measures of this sort have important problems. For one thing, it fre-
quently is difficult to find suitable weights for different innovations.
(Clearly, all are not of equal importance.) For another thing, such
measures overlook the small innovations, which sometimes have a bigger
cumulative effect than some of the more spectacular innovations. (For
evidence on this score in petroleum and synthetic fibers, see Enos 1958
and Hollander 1965.) Nonetheless, it is worthwhile taking a brief look
at results based on data of this sort.
In the pharmaceutical industry, the number of new chemical entities
per year (excluding salts or esters of previously marketed drugs) de-
clined from an average of about forty during the 1950s to about twenty
during the 1950s to about fifteen during the early 1970s. This decline
Table 8.8 United States Patents Due to United States Inventors, by Year











































































































































































Source: National Science Foundation 1977.
Note: Most of these patents were assigned to United States corporations.578 Edwin Mansfield/Ruben F. Mettler/David Packard
has caused considerable controversy. The drug industry charges that it is
due in considerable measure to new government regulations. Others
attribute it, at least in part, to the fact that the field is more thoroughly
worked over than it was shortly after World War II, and that it has
become increasingly difficult and costly to make major advances. As
pointed out by Grabowski (1976) and others, available estimates indi-
cate very substantial increases during the 1960s in the costs of develop-
ing a new drug.
Counts of innovations have also been used to indicate changes over
time in the nature of major innovations introduced by United States
firms. The National Science Foundation (1977) reports a study of 277
major innovations marketed by United States manufacturing firms that
tried to rate how radical each innovation was. In 1953-59, 36 percent
of the innovations were rated as radical breakthroughs (rather than as
major technological shifts, improvements, or imitations), as contrasted
with 26 percent in 1960-66 and 16 percent in 1967-73. Although the
results are of interest, ratings of this sort should be viewed with consid-
erable caution.
8.6 The Diffusion oi Innovations
How rapidly productivity increases in response to an innovation de-
pends on the rate of diffusion—the rate at which the use of the inno-
vation spreads. Diffusion, like the earlier stages in the creation and
assimilation of new techniques and products, is essentially a learning
process. However, instead of being confined to a research laboratory
or a few firms, the learning takes place among a considerable number
of users and producers. In the United States, how rapidly does the diffu-
sion process go on? According to the available data, it takes about five
to ten years, on the average, before one-half of the major firms in an
industry begin using an important technique. And in many cases it takes
longer. The rate of imitation varies widely (Mansfield 1968b).
To explain the differences among innovations in the rate of imitation,
Mansfield (1968a) suggested a simple model that assumes that the
probability that a nonuser will use the innovation between time / and
time t-\-l is dependent on the proportion of firms already using the
innovation, the profitability of using the innovation, and the investment
required to install the innovation. Mansfield tested this model against
data for over a dozen innovations in five industries, the results being
quite favorable. Hsia (1973) found that this model provides a good fit
to data regarding twenty-six innovations in the plastics, textiles, and
electronics industries in Hong Kong. Blackman (1971) found this model
to be useful in his studies of the United States aircraft industry. Romeo579 Technology and Productivity in the United States
used a variant of this model in his study (in Mansfield et al. 1977a)
of numerically controlled machine tools.
To indicate more specifically how rapidly some major innovations
have spread in the period since World War II, table 8.9 shows the in-
crease over time in the percentage of (1) steel output produced by the
basic oxygen process, (2) ammonia capacity accounted for by large-
scale plants (600 tons per day or more), (3) acrylonitrile output pro-
duced from propylene, (4) vinyl chloride capacity that uses the oxy-
chlorination process, and (5) value of discrete semiconductors and
receiving tubes accounted for by discrete semiconductors. On the aver-
age, it took about eight years before half of the output or capacity was
accounted for by these innovations.
At least two studies have been made which shed light on whether or
not innovations spread more rapidly than they used to. First, when the
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profitability of the innovation and the size of the investment required
to introduce the innovation are held constant in Mansfield's study, there
is an apparent tendency for the rate of diffusion to increase over time.
However, this tendency was very weak. The time interval between 20
percent adoption and 80 percent adoption decreased, on the average, by
only about four-tenths of 1 percent per year. Further, this observed
tendency could easily have been due to chance.
Second, in the case of chemicals, a study (reported in Mansfield et al.
1977a) of the diffusion of twenty-three major processes was carried
out by Simon. His results indicate that an innovation's rate of diffusion
is affected by the profitability of the innovation to users and by whether
or not the firms that imitated the innovator used its process or invented
around it. Holding both of these variables constant, there is a tendency
for the rate of imitation to be higher for more recent innovations. More-
over, this tendency is statistically significant. Also, holding other factors
constant, there seems to be a tendency for new chemical products to be
imitated more rapidly than was the case a number of years ago.
Thus, what evidence we have points to an acceleration, rather than a
slowdown, in the rate of diffusion. In part, this has probably been due
to the growth of more effective mechanisms to transmit and evaluate
technical information. For example, the engineering literature is more
extensive and detailed, and evaluation techniques are more sophisticated.
Turning to international comparisons, the United States seemed to be a
leader in accepting some of the innovations in table 8.9. For example,
this was the case for semiconductors. But with respect to the basic oxy-
gen process in steel, a number of other countries had a faster rate of
acceptance than the United States.
8.7 America's Technological Lead
To understand the changes in America's technological position in the
postwar period, it is necessary to compare United States technological
capabilities with those in other countries. Based on international com-
parisons of total productivity and on data indicating which countries
have developed and exported new and improved products, there appears
to have been a substantial gap between European and American tech-
nology. Thus, Denison (1967) concluded that productivity differences
between Europe and the United States could not be explained fully by
differences in capital per worker, education, or other such variables.
And Vernon (1966) and Hufbauer (1970) have demonstrated that, to
a large extent, American exports have been in new products which other
countries have not yet produced.
This gap does not seem to be new. The available evidence, which is
fragmentary, suggests the existence of such a gap in many technological581 Technology and Productivity in the United States
areas prior to 1850. After 1850, total productivity seemed higher in the
United States than in Europe, the United States had a strong export
position in technically progressive industries, and Europeans tended to
imitate American techniques. American inventors were enormously pro-
ductive during the nineteenth century, and the United States held a
technological lead in many major areas of manufacturing.
The technology gap received considerable attention in the 1960s,
when many Europeans claimed that superior technology had permitted
American firms to get large shares of European markets in such areas
as aircraft, space equipment, computers, and other electronic products.
In response to the Europeans' concern, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) carried out a major study (1968)
of the nature and causes of the technology gap. The study concluded
that a large gap existed in computers and electronic components, but
that no general or fundamental gap existed in drugs, bulk plastics, iron
and steel, machine tools (other than numerically controlled machine
tools), nonferrous metals (other than tantalum and titanium), and scien-
tific instruments (other than electronic test and measuring instruments).
The longstanding technological lead enjoyed by the United States has
undoubtedly been due to a variety of factors—such as the favorable
social and business climate in the United States, our competitive system,
and the values of the American people. According to the OECD studies,
the size and homogeneity of the United States market has been an im-
portant factor but not a decisive one. Also, the bigness of American
firms is considered to be another factor but not a decisive one. Further,
the large government expenditures on R & D in the United States have
been credited with an important role. In addition, according to the
OECD studies, American firms have had a significant lead in managerial
techniques, including those involved in managing R & D and in coupling
R & D with marketing and production.
More recently, American analysts and policy makers have expressed
increasing concern that the United States technological lead is being
reduced and in some areas eliminated. At least three types of evidence
have been adduced. First, as shown in table 8.10, the percentage increase
in American labor productivity has been smaller than in Japan, Ger-
many, France, or the United Kingdom. In Japan, output per man-hour
grew by 290 percent during 1960-76, as compared with about 60 per-
cent in the United States. Christenson, Cummings, and Jorgenson (forth-
coming) have estimated that the rate of increase of total productivity
during 1960-73 was lower in the United States than in Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, or the United Kingdom.
Although the level of productivity in other countries still tends to be
lower than in the United States, results of this kind have been inter-












































































Source: National Science Foundation 1977.
Second, as shown in table 8.11, R&D expenditures as a percentage
of gross national product have increased in Japan, Germany, and the
Soviet Union, while they have decreased in the United States. But this
evidence should be treated with caution. Although the percentage of
gross national product devoted to R & D has increased in these coun-
tries relative to the United States, the United States percentage is still
higher than any country other than the Soviet Union, where the figures
are not comparable (and probably inflated relative to ours). Also, as
we shall see in the following section of this paper, much of the industrial
R & D in some major foreign countries is done by United States-based
multinational firms. One-half of the industrial R&D in Canada and
one-seventh of the industrial R & D in Germany and the United King-
dom were carried out by United States-based firms in the early 1970s.
And more fundamentally, a nation's rate of economic growth depends
on how effectively it uses both foreign and domestic technology, and this
may not be measured at all well by its ratio of R & D spending to gross
national product.
Third, the National Science Foundation (1977) has reported a study
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the major innovations in 1953-58, about 67 percent of the major inno-
vations in 1959-64, and about 57 percent of the major innovations in
1965-73. Without knowing more about the way in which the sample
of innovations was drawn, it is hard to tell whether the apparent reduc-
tion in the proportion of innovations stemming from the United States
is due to the sampling procedures. Also, some attempt might have been
made to weight these innovations. Nonetheless, taken at face value, the
results suggest a reduction in the United States technological lead.
8.8 International Technology Transfer
In recent years, the international transfer of technology has become
of intense interest to analysts and policy makers. A firm can use various
channels to transfer its new technology abroad. It can export goods and
services that are based on the new technology. Or it can use the new
technology in foreign subsidiaries. Or it can license the new technology
to other firms, government agencies, or other organizations that utilize
it abroad. Or it can engage in joint ventures with other organizations,
which have as an objective the utilization of the new technology abroad.
International technology transfer accounts for a substantial propor-
tion of the returns from R & D carried out by United States firms. Based
on a study of thirty major firms, Mansfield, Romeo, and Wagner (1979)
found that about 30 percent of the returns from these firms' 1974 R & D
were expected to come from foreign sales or foreign utilization. During
the first five years after the commercialization of the technology, foreign
subsidiaries (rather than exports, licensing, or joint ventures) were ex-
pected to be the principal channel of transfer in about 70 percent of the
cases (table 8.12). This is noteworthy because, according to the tradi-
Table 8.12 Percentage Distribution of R & D Projects, by Anticipated
Channel of International Technology Transfer, First Five
Years after Commercialization, Twenty-three Firms, 1974
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tional view, the first channel of international technology transfer often
is exports. Only after the overseas market has been supplied for some
time by exports would the new technology be transferred overseas via
foreign subsidiaries according to this view.
To some extent, these results seem to reflect an increased tendency
for new technology to be transferred directly to overseas subsidiaries,
or a tendency for it to be transmitted more quickly to them (in part
because more such subsidiaries already exist). Such tendencies have
been noted in the drug industry, where many new products developed
by United States drug firms have been introduced first by their sub-
sidiaries in Britain and elsewhere. Also, Baranson (1976), based on
twenty-five case studies, concludes that American firms of various types
are more willing than in the past to send their most recently developed
technology overseas. And Davidson and Harrigan (1977) have shown
that United States firms introduce their new products in foreign markets
much sooner than they used to (table 8.13), and that foreign subsidi-
aries are used more frequently (and licensing is used less frequently)
as a channel of transfer than used to be true.
Mansfield and Romeo (in press) gathered data concerning sixty-five
technologies to see whether the proportion of transferred technologies
that were less than five years old (at the time of transfer) was greater
during 1969-78 than during 1960-68. For technologies transferred to
subsidiaries in developed countries, this was the case, and the increase
in this proportion (from 27 percent in 1960-68 to 75 percent in 1969-
78) was both large and statistically significant. But for technologies
transferred to subsidiaries in developing countries or for those trans-
ferred through channels other than subsidiaries, there appeared to be
no such tendency, at least in this sample. The fact that the technologies
licensed to, or jointly exploited with, non-United States firms were no
newer in 1969-78 than in 1960-68 is worth noting, since some observers
Table 8.13 Percentage of New Products Introduced Abroad within One and
Five Years of Introduction in the United States, 1945-75
Percentage Introduced Abroad
Period Number of —-—
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worry that United States firms may have come to share in this way more
and more of their newest technologies with foreigners.
In general, the evidence suggests that the rate of international diffu-
sion of technology has tended to increase. Because of better communica-
tion and transportation techniques, as well as other factors, such an
increase is quite understandable. Cooper (1972) has presented some
evidence to this effect. Also, the OECD studies (1968) of the technol-
ogy gap come to the same conclusion. One of the most recent studies of
this topic was by Schwartz (1979), who investigated the international
diffusion of fifteen plastics innovations, thirteen semiconductor innova-
tions, and nine drug innovations. Holding other factors constant, he
found that the diffusion rate tended to be higher for more recent inno-
vations in each industry, although this tendency was statistically signifi-
cant only in plastics.
According to the National Science Foundation (1977), data concern-
ing United States receipts and payments of licensing fees and royalties
can be used as an indicator of the amount of know-how transferred by
the United States, as well as the direction of the technology flows.
Tables 8.14 and 8.15 present the latest data published by the National
Science Foundation. According to these figures, the United States re-
ceived about $3.5 billion from foreign affiliates and about $800 million
from unaffiliated foreign residents in 1975, and paid about $200 million
to foreign affiliates and about $200 million to unaffiliated foreign resi-
dents. Based on tables 8.14 and 8.15, American receipts and payments
of this sort more than tripled during 1966-75, and those to unaffiliated
foreign residents more than doubled during this period.
These figures, while interesting, suffer from many defects. For one
thing, payments of this sort between affiliated firms are influenced by tax
and other considerations. For another, much technology is transferred
internationally without payment because the technology is not patented,
because firms in one country copy (without payment) features of new
products or processes originating in another country, and so on. None-
theless, tables 8.14 and 8.15 can be used to support at least two impor-
tant propositions. First, it seems clear that the international transfer of
technology is a large and rapidly growing business. Second, it seems
clear that multinational firms play a very important role in the inter-
national transfer of technology.
Studies by Baranson (1976), Caves (1971), Hufbauer (1970), OECD
(1968), Tilton (1971), and others show in much more detail the major
role played by multinational firms in the international transfer of tech-
nology. As would be expected, the preponderant flow of technology has
been out of the United States. In recent years, with the trend toward
increased foreign direct investment in the United States, some observers
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access to important United States technology. According to the National
Academy of Engineering (1976), access to American technology is less
important than many other factors in prompting such investment.
Another important development in the postwar period has been the
growth of overseas R & D by United States-based multinational firms.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the percentage of total company-
financed R & D expenditures carried out overseas grew substantially.
By the middle 1970s, it had risen to almost 10 percent. (Table 8.16
presents data for fifty-five firms.) According to Mansfield, Teece, and
Romeo (1979), much of this R & D is aimed at the special design needs
of overseas markets. It tends to be predominantly development rather
than research, and aimed at product and process modification rather
than at entirely new products or processes.
Firms differ considerably in the extent to which they have integrated
their overseas R & D with their domestic R & D. Some firms, such as the
IBM Corporation, have integrated their R & D activities on a worldwide
basis. Such worldwide integration existed in about half of the firms
studied by Mansfield, Teece, and Romeo. Most overseas R & D seems
to have some commercial applicability to the firms' United States oper-
ations. According to the firms studied by Mansfield, Teece, and Romeo,
a dollar's worth of overseas R & D seems to result in benefits to these
firms' domestic operations that are equivalent to about fifty cents of
R & D carried out in the United States.
Some groups, such as the AFL-CIO, have pressed for measures to
regulate the international transfer of technology to prevent our advanced
technology from becoming available to competitors in other nations.
Thus, in 1971, the AFL-CIO suggested that "the President [be given]
clear authority to regulate, supervise, and curb licensing and patent
agreements on the basis of Congressionally determined standards."
3
Economists generally seem to have been rather skeptical of such pro-
posals to interfere with the international diffusion of technology,, It
would be very difficult to stem the diffusion of technology, and even if
it could be done, it would invite retaliation. Technology flows both into
and out of the United States, and there are mutual benefits from inter-
national specialization with respect to technology.
Table 8.16 Percentage of Company-Financed R & D
Expenditures Carried out Overseas,
1960-74, Fifty-five Firms
1960 1965 1970 1972 1974
Thirty-five-Firm Subsample 2 6 6 8 10
Twenty-Firm Subsample — — 4 — 9
Source: Mansfield, Teece, and Romeo 1979.589 Technology and Productivity in the United States
In addition, if United States firms could not transfer and utilize their
technology abroad, they would not carry out as much research and de-
velopment, with the result that our technological position would be
weakened. According to results obtained by Mansfield, Romeo, and
Wagner (1979), public policy makers should not assume that decreased
opportunities for international technology transfer would have little or
no effect on United States R&D expenditures. On the contrary, if
United States firms could not transfer their new technology to their
foreign subsidiaries, the result might well be a 10 or 15 percent drop in
their R&D expenditures.
Some groups have also pressed for government support of R & D in
industries where our technological lead seems to be declining. The inter-
national competitiveness of particular American industries will depend
in the long run on the government's policies with respect to science and
technology, but this does not mean that government support for science
and technology should be focused on industries experiencing problems
in meeting foreign competition. As pointed out in the next section of this
paper, whether or not more R&D should be supported or encouraged
in a particular industry depends on the extent of the social payoff from
additional R&D there, not on whether or not our technological lead
there seems to be declining.
8.9 Public Policies toward Civilian Technology
The federal government finances about half of the research and devel-
opment in the United States. During the 1950s and 1960s, over 80 per-
cent of the government's R&D expenditures went for military and space
projects. During the 1970s, this percentage fell to about 63 percent.
Federal expenditures on civilian R&D (notably health, energy, environ-
ment, transportation, and communication) have increased considerably
as a percentage of the total, as shown in table 8.17. This is a noteworthy
shift in the composition of federal R&D expenditures.
The rationale for government support of R & D varies from one area
of support to another. National security and space exploration, for ex-
ample, are public goods—goods where it is inefficient (and often impos-
sible) to deny their benefits to a citizen who is unwilling to pay the price.
For goods of this sort, since the government must take the primary re-
sponsibility for their production, it must also take primary responsibility
for the promotion of technological change in relevant areas. Of course,
such R&D results in a beneficial spillover to the civilian sector, but the
benefits to civilian technology seem decidedly less than if the funds were
spent directly on civilian technology.
Market failure of some kind is the rationale for large federally fi-
nanced R&D expenditures in other areas. In energy, for example, it has590 Edwin Mansfield/Ruben F. Mettler/David Packard
been claimed that the social returns from energy R & D exceed the
private returns due to the difficulties faced by firms in appropriating the
social benefits from their R & D. Further, it has been argued that risk
aversion on the part of firms may lead to an underinvestment (from
society's point of view) in energy R & D. Also, the availability of energy
is often linked to our national security.
As shown in table 8.17, some federally financed R&D is directed
toward the general advance of science and technology. Expenditures of
this sort seem justified because the private sector will almost certainly
invest less than is socially optimal in many of the most fundamental
types of research, because the results of such research are unpredictable
and frequently of relatively little direct value to the firm supporting the
research, although potentially of great value to society as a whole.
Besides its financing of R & D, the federal government influences and
supports civilian technology in a variety of other ways. The patent laws,
the tax laws, federal regulatory policies, the antitrust laws, and govern-
ment policies toward education—all have an impact on the rate of
technological change. And in the period since World War II, all have
been the subject of considerable and widespread debate. At present,
much of this debate has surfaced in connection with the Domestic Policy
Review on Industrial Innovation, discussed below.
For a variety of reasons, a number of economists, such as Arrow
(1962), Griliches (1972), Mansfield (1976), and Nelson, Peck, and
Kalachek (1967), have suggested that there may be an underinvestment
in civilian R & D in the United States. Because R & D is characterized
by substantial external economies, riskiness, and indivisibilities, such a
tendency might be expected in a competitive economy. However, on
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a priori grounds alone, one cannot demonstrate conclusively that this is
true in the brand of mixed capitalism found at present in the United
States. A number of empirical studies (some of which are cited in sec-
tion 8.3) have been carried out to estimate the social rate of return from
R & D. In general, the results indicate that the marginal social rate of
return has been very high, which seems to suggest that some underin-
vestment may in fact exist. However, existing studies are rough and
should be viewed with caution.
To illustrate, Mansfield et al. (1977b) estimated the social and pri-
vate rates of return from the investments in seventeen industrial innova-
tions, most of them run-of-the-mill advances in the state of the art. The
median social rate of return was over 50 percent, while the median
private rate of return was 25 percent. In five of these cases, the expected
private rate of return was less than 15 percent (before taxes), which
indicates that they were quite marginal from the point of view of the
firm. Yet their average social rate of return was over 100 percent. This
study was replicated by both Nathan Associates and Foster Associates,
and the results of their studies are in accord with those given above.
The federal government has made a number of proposals and efforts
to stimulate civilian technology. In 1963 the Department of Commerce
proposed a Civilian Industrial Technology program to encourage and
support additional R&D in industries that it regarded as lagging. It
proposed that support be given in important industries, from the point
of view of employment, foreign trade, and so forth, which have "limited
or dispersed technological resources." Examples cited by the department
included textiles, building and construction, machine tools and metal
fabrication, lumber, foundries, and castings. The proposal met with little
success on Capitol Hill. Industrial groups opposed the bill because they
feared that government sponsorship of industrial R&D could upset
existing competitive relationships.
In 1972, former President Nixon, in his special message to the Con-
gress on science and technology, established three programs related to
federal support of civilian R&D. One was an analytical program at the
National Science Foundation to support studies of barriers to innovation
and the effects of alternative federal policies on these barriers. This
program (the R&D Assessment Program) has provided a substantial
addition to fundamental knowledge in this area, and is now part of the
Foundation's Division of Policy Research and Analysis. The other two
programs, one at the National Science Foundation and one at the Na-
tional Bureau of Standards, were to be experimental programs to deter-
mine effective ways of stimulating innovation. Both of the latter programs
no longer exist in their original form, although elements of them remain.
In 1978 and 1979, the federal government carried out a Domestic
Policy Review on Industrial Innovation. The Industry Advisory SubT592 Edwin Mansfield/Ruben F. Mettler/David Packard
committee involved in this Review prepared draft reports on (1) federal
procurement, (2) direct support of R&D, (3) environmental, health,
and safety regulations, (4) industry structure, (5) economic and trade
policy, (6) patents, and (7) information policy. These drafts were dis-
cussed and criticized by the Academic and Public Interest Subcommit-
tees involved in the review. Further, the Labor Subcommittee presented
a report, as did each of a large number of government agencies. The
overall result was a large and far-flung effort to come up with policy
recommendations.
One theme that ran through the Industry Subcommittee's reports was
that many aspects of environmental, health, and safety regulations deter
innovation. As pointed out in previous sections, there is a strong feeling
that this is the case in a number of industries, although it is recognized
that we lack very dependable or precise estimates of the effects of par-
ticular regulatory rules on the rate of innovation. However, the recom-
mendations of the Industry Subcommittee with respect to regulatory
changes were met with considerable hostility by the Labor and Public
Interest Subcommittees.
Another theme found in some of the Industry Subcommittee's reports
was that tax credits for R & D expenditures should be considered seri-
ously. Although this mechanism to encourage civilian technology has
the advantage that it would entail less direct government control than
some of the other possible mechanisms, it would reward firms for doing
R&D that they would have done anyway, it would not help firms that
have no profits, and it would be likely to encourage the same kind of
R&D that is already being done (rather than the more radical and
risky work where the shortfall, if it exists, is likely to be greatest). A tax
credit for increases in R & D would get around some of these difficulties,
but the problem of defining R&D remains. As might be expected, the
Treasury Department is particularly concerned about this definitional
problem.
In October 1979, President Carter put forth a number of proposals,
based on the Domestic Policy Review. He asked Congress to establish
a consistent policy with respect to patents arising from government
R&D, and advocated exclusive licenses for firms that would commer-
cialize inventions of this sort. He asked the Justice Department to write
guidelines indicating the conditions under which firms in the same indus-
try can carry out joint research projects without running afoul of the
antitrust laws. Also, to reduce regulatory uncertainties, he asked environ-
mental, health, and safety agencies to formulate a five-year forecast: of
what rules they think will be adopted.
In addition, President Carter proposed a new unit at the National
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from government laboratories to private industry, and he proposed that
the National Science Foundation and several other agencies expand an
existing program of grants to firms and universities that carry out col-
laborative research. He also asked that a program to support innovative
small businesses (currently under way at the National Science Founda-
tion) be expanded by $10 million in 1981. And he proposed that gov-
ernment procurement policies put more stress on performance standards
rather than specific design specifications.
4
Although this program may have many beneficial effects, it is hard to
believe that it can have a very major impact on the nation's technologi-
cal position. As its principal architects are the first to admit, it is only a
first step. This exercise, like its predecessors in previous administrations,
demonstrates that it is not easy to formulate an effective, equitable, and
politically acceptable program. Further attempts will almost certainly be
made. In formulating future proposals, it seems to be generally agreed
that any program should be neither large-scale nor organized on a crash
basis, that it should not be focused on helping beleaguered industries,
that it should not get the government involved in the latter stages of
development work, that a proper coupling should be maintained be-
tween technology and the market, and that the advantages of pluralism
and decentralized decision-making should be recognized (Mansfield
1976).
Finally, the emergence of technology assessment during the 1960s
should be noted. As public awareness of environmental problems grew,
more and more emphasis was placed on the costs (such as air and water
pollution) associated with technological change in the civilian economy.
Policy makers became increasingly interested in technology assessment,
which is the process whereby an attempt is made to appraise the tech-
nical, political, economic, and social effects of new technologies. In
1972, Congress created the Office of Technology Assessment to help it
anticipate, and plan for, the consequences of the uses of new technology.
Unfortunately, it is notoriously difficult to forecast the future develop-
ment and impact of a new technology, and technology assessment has
proved very hard to carry out.
Also, the effects of the energy crisis on United States technology
policy should be cited. Between 1974 and 1977, federal R&D obliga-
tions for energy development and conversion increased at an annual rate
of over 50 percent. Between 1977 and 1978, they increased at an an-
nual rate of over 20 percent. Many aspects of the government's R&D
policies in the energy area have been controversial. In 1979 one of the
biggest issues was whether the government should grant massive sub-
sidies to fund the commercialization of synthetic fuels. As Pindyck
(1979), Stobaugh and Yergen (1979), and others have pointed out,594 Edwin Mansfield/Ruben F. Mettler/David Packard
there are very considerable problems with some of these proposals. In
November 1979, the Senate approved a $19 billion program to develop
a synthetic fuels industry.
8.10 Summary and Conclusions
During the thirty-five years that have elapsed since World War II, at
least eight very important changes have taken place in American pro-
ductivity and technology. First, the rate of productivity increase, which
was relatively high up until about 1966, fell somewhat during 1966-73
and then took a nosedive in the mid-1970s. Some of this decline can be
attributed to changes in the composition of the labor force, reductions
in the rate of growth of the capital-labor ratio, and increasingly stringent
pollution, safety, and health regulations. But most of the decline during
the mid-1970s cannot be explained in this way. To some extent, it may
have been due to the disruptions caused by the quadrupling of oil prices
and the double-digit inflation of the mid-1970s. To some extent, it may
have been due to a slowdown in the rate of innovation. The unfortunate
truth is that we do not know how much of the decline is due to each of
these factors.
Second, R & D expenditures in the United States increased at a rela-
tively rapid rate until the middle 1960s, after which they remained
relatively constant in real terms. After 1967, federal R&D expenditures
decreased, due in large part to reductions of space and defense programs,
while industry's R&D expenditures increased, but at a much slower rate
than before 1967. As a percentage of gross national product, R&D
expenditures fell from 3.0 percent in 1964 to 2.2 percent in 1978. Also,
there was a substantial decline between 1967 and 1977 in the propor-
tion of company financed R&D expenditures devoted to basic and
relatively risky projects. These developments are important because a
variety of econometric studies indicate that an industry's or firm's rate
of productivity increase is related significantly to the amount it spends
on R & D. Also, holding constant the amount spent on R & D, an indus-
try's rate of productivity increase during 1948-66 seemed to be directly
related to the extent to which its R & D was long term.
Third, the employment of scientists and engineers grew relatively
rapidly from 1950 to 1963, less rapidly from 1963 to 1970, and very
slowly from 1970 to 1974. In many major firms, the engineering labor
force is much older than in 1960. The percentage of bachelor's (and
first professional) degrees awarded in engineering and in the physical
and environmental sciences decreased considerably between 1960 and
1975.
Fourth, when patents are classified by date of application, the peak
patenting rate for United States residents occurred in 1969, after which
it declined. In practically all of the fifty-two product fields for which595 Technology and Productivity in the United States
data are available, the patent rate declined during the 1970s. The only
exceptions are in drugs, agricultural chemicals, and motorcycles, bi-
cycles, and parts. Counts of innovations seem to indicate that in some
industries, notably pharmaceuticals, the rate of innovation declined dur-
ing the 1970s. Also, there is some evidence that the percentage of United
States innovations that are radical breakthroughs tended to decrease
during the 1960s and 1970s.
Fifth, when other factors are held equal, the available evidence indi-
cates that there may have been an increase in the rate of diffusion of
innovations. New processes tend to spread more rapidly from firm to
firm and to replace old processes more quickly than in the past. Also,
there is some evidence that new products are imitated more quickly than
in the past. In part, this has probably been due to the growth of more
extensive and effective mechanisms to transmit and evaluate technical
information.
Sixth, the longstanding technological lead that the United States has
maintained in many branches of manufacturing technology seems to be
lessening, and in some areas it may no longer exist. Productivity has
been increasing less rapidly in the United States than in other major
countries since 1960. Rough data seem to indicate a decrease in the
proportion of major innovations originating in the United States. Al-
though it is very difficult to make meaningful international comparisons
of technology levels, there seems to be widespread concern among pol-
icy makers on this score.
Seventh, the rate of international diffusion of technology has tended
to increase, due in part to the growth of multinational firms. United
States-based firms seemed to transfer newer technology to their overseas
subsidiaries more in 1969-78 than in 1960-68. The percentage of
R & D carried out overseas has increased considerably, and some major
firms organize and integrate their R & D on a worldwide basis. Accord-
ing to a study of thirty major firms, about 30 percent of the returns from
these firms' 1974 R&D were expected to come from foreign sales or
foreign utilization. And in the bulk of the cases, foreign subsidiaries
were expected to be the principal channel of international technology
transfer in the first five years after commercialization. Although some
groups have pressed for measures to regulate the international transfer
of technology, most economists seem to be skeptical of such proposals.
Eighth, the federal government, which supports about half of the
R & D in the United States, has reduced the proportion of its R&D
going for defense and space, and increased the proportion going for
civilian purposes (notably health, energy, environment, transportation,
and communication). There is some evidence that there may be an
underinvestment in civilian R&D, and that government regulations and
policies may have erected unnecessary obstacles to innovation. A series
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Unfortunately, although it is becoming clearer that a variety of prob-
lems exists in this area, it is less obvious how much the government
can or will do to help solve them. To a considerable extent, this reflects
the fact that we know less than is frequently acknowledged concerning
the efficacy (and costs) of various policy alternatives that have been
proposed.
Finally, it is important to recognize that America's technology policies
cannot be separated from its economic policies. Policies which encour-
age economic growth, saving and investment, and price stability are
likely to benefit our technological position. Just as many of our current
technological problems can be traced to sources outside engineering
and science, so these problems can be ameliorated by policies relating
primarily to nontechnological areas. Indeed, the general economic cli-
mate in the United States may have more impact on the state of United
States technology than many of the specific measures that have been
proposed to stimulate technological change.
Notes
1. National Science Foundation, Methodology of Statistics on Research and
Development (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 124.
2. When the annual rate of productivity change during 1948-76 is used instead,
this relationship no longer exists, but this may be due to the changes over time in
the extent to which various industries' R & D have been long term. More work is
needed on this point.
3. See A. Biemiller's testimony on 28 July 1971 in Science, Technology, and the
Economy, Hearings before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Science, Research,
and Development (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 53.
4. Other proposals were made as well. For a more complete account, see The
President's Industrial Innovation Initiatives, Office of the White House Press Sec-
retary, 31 October 1979.
2. Ruben F. Mettler
Technology: A Powerful Agent for Change
Introduction
An invitation to say a few words about technological changes and their
effect on the postwar domestic American economy is certainly a chal-
lenge. The subject is rich in opportunity for speculation—and rich in
opportunity for error.
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Technological change during the postwar period has been rampant.
One need not search far to see powerful and pervasive technological
innovations introduced into the economy in recent years, based on fun-
damental advances in mathematics, physics, chemistry, geology, and
biology, and their applications in fields of direct significance to the
economy: agriculture and food production; medicine and human health;
energy conversion and utilization; transportation; construction and ur-
ban development; communications and information processing; instru-
mentation and control; industrial production; extraction and conversion
of raw materials; military development and national security; and earth
and space exploration.
Some of the major technological changes have been slow and evolu-
tionary and some have been sudden and dramatic. New scientific and
engineering understanding and brilliant inventions only become innova-
tions that significantly influence the economy with the addition of man-
agement, capital, marketing, distribution, production, maintenance, and
widespread extensions of human skills.
Changes in the American and in the world economy, while heavily
influenced by technological change are, of course, more deeply rooted
in the world's major political, social, and economic forces, and must be
judged and interpreted in the context of:
1. Population growth and the related need for food and shelter and
education and jobs, with the resulting pressures on political and
social and economic institutions
2. Limitations on the supply and distribution of energy and national
resources as well as on related environmental issues
3. Enormous variations in income levels per capita in different parts
of the world
4. Dependence on international trade and investment and continuing
real economic growth
5. Reconciliation of conflicting cultures and value systems as modern
communication and transportation increasingly force them into in-
timate contact
6. Vulnerability of vital and increasingly complex national and inter-
national institutions to disruption by small groups
7. Foreign policy and national security issues related to these major
problems in a world possessing nuclear weapons
Rather than discuss technological changes in general terms, I wish to
comment on three important changes in our domestic economy which
have been heavily influenced by technology during the past thirty years
and which are likely to be equally or more important during the next
thirty years. In addition, I will comment on a sweeping technological
wave of such significance to economic development that it requires spe-
cial treatment.598 Edwin Mansfield/Ruben F. Met tier/David Packard
I won't comment directly on Edwin Mansfield's excellent background
paper on technology and productivity, except to underscore and empha-
size his very last paragraph in which he cites the high leverage which
sound general policies encouraging economic growth, savings, invest-
ment, and price stability have on stimulating technological progress.
International Constraints on Our Domestic Economy
Few changes in the domestic American economy in the postwar pe-
riod appear to me to be as significant and as inadequately recognized,
particularly by national policy makers, as those changes—heavily influ-
enced by technology—which increasingly bind the domestic economy to
the rest of the world, and make it a more dependent subelement of a
larger and more powerful economic system.
These binding forces exert a discipline on national policy makers by
creating significant conflicts between politics and policies which are pop-
ular domestically but incompatible with international reality. They force
on business executives the recognition that many of their markets are
worldwide in scope and that they must compete worldwide to survive
in those markets. Some of the puzzles and surprises in postwar domestic
economic analysis and modeling may be the result of a preoccupation
with internal variables and insufficient recognition of the scope and sig-
nificance of external international forces on our domestic economy. All
of these effects are amplified by our voracious appetite for energy.
Multinational corporations (American and foreign) have been the
principal agents for the large increase in international trade in the post-
war period and for the dramatic postwar expansion in international
investment, credit, and money that now link our domestic economy ever
more tightly to the rest of the world.
These linkages and the resulting constraints on our domestic economy
have in large part been fashioned by technological changes which are
still gaining momentum and may be even more important in the years
ahead. Included among the more important technologies working to
bind our domestic economy to the rest of the world are those related
to agriculture and food production and to finding, producing, transport-
ing, and refining massive quantities of petroleum products. But I'd like
to comment today especially on (1) communications and information
processing and (2) jet transportation.
In worldwide communications a sudden qualitative change took place
in the 1960s when high capacity commercial communication satellites
were first; launched into orbit. The first such satellite placed in synchro-
nous orbit over the Atlantic provided more communications capacity
than all of the transatlantic cables and radio links previously built, at a
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equipped with wide-band transmission links came to dominate long dis-
tance communication of voice, data, and television to all parts of the
globe, at significantly reduced costs.
In parallel with this quick expansion of worldwide communications
capacity came the development and volume production of digital com-
puters and related information processing systems, and the rapid devel-
opment and expansion of the worldwide system of jet transportation.
Communications and computers, backed up by quick and convenient
passenger transportation, have been and are essential tools in the inter-
national expansion and control of multinational industrial and banking
institutions, with their significant effect on the world economy and hence
on our domestic economy.
Dramatic Changes in Military Technology
During the postwar period there have been a number of concurrent
technological breakthroughs that have dramatically altered the nature
and power of military forces. These changes have had a first-order effect
not only on the foreign policy of the United States and of its adversaries
and allies, but also on the world economy and hence also on our domes-
tic economy. The effects of these changes are now gathering momentum
and will be even more significant in the next thirty years.
During the 1950s the almost concurrent development of small nuclear
warheads (with unbelievably greater destructive power than even the
atomic warheads of the 1940s, which in turn had overshadowed all prior
explosives) and large rocket-propelled missiles of intercontinental range,
permanently changed the nature and power of strategic military forces.
For the first time in history, strategic military forces with the power to
completely destroy an industrialized society became an instrument of
foreign policy.
During the 1960s and 1970s further development of sensing instru-
ments and control electronics gave these missiles pinpoint accuracy.
High accuracy combined with large numbers of missiles and warheads
make it possible for an aggressive superpower to aspire to having a
first-strike capability able to deliver a knock-out blow, again drastically
altering the strategic military equation.
From a position of overwhelming strategic military dominance during
the 1950s and early 1960s, the United States followed policies which (it
is now widely, though belatedly, recognized) will result in strategic mili-
tary superiority passing to the Soviet Union during the 1980s, unless
vigorous new United States military (nuclear and nonnuclear) develop-
ment and production programs are initiated and sustained during the
next decade. During 1970-78, the Soviet Union spent about $100 bil-
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ties and about $40 billion more on military R & D than did the United
States. In the crucial category of strategic weapons and R&D, they
outspent the United States by more than two to one.
I believe these changes, although difficult to quantify, have already
had important effects on our domestic economy in the past several
decades and will be even more significant during the next several, par-
ticularly when viewed in the context of the increasing vulnerability of
our economy to interruption of supplies and our increasing linkage to
the world economy and world political forces. If allowed to proceed
unchecked, the Soviet Union, under an umbrella of strategic nuclear
superiority, could be more aggressive and adventuresome in using con-
ventional military forces and in exerting diplomatic pressure.
Consider first some effects internal to our domestic economy. Even
though our military programs have been significantly less aggressive
than those of the Soviet Union, they have absorbed federally funded
R&D and a significant fraction of industrial technological talent during
the 1960s and 1970s, with a resulting penalty to new commercial pro-
cesses and products and to industrial productivity. As we look to the
1980s, it is now increasingly evident that the United States must step up
its military programs or live with Soviet military dominance with all of
its unacceptable consequences. In this situation, the negative effects on
our domestic economy of large military expenditures will continue and
may increase. The Soviet Union, with a smaller and less productive
economy than ours and with much larger military programs may also
suffer a penalty to domestic productivity and economic strength.
Two of our economic competitors, Germany and Japan, have gained
in productivity and relative economic strength in recent decades by
holding their military expenditures to a very low level and depending on
the United States for strategic military security. Essentially all of their
research and development and industrial capacity has been focused on
their civilian economy. How significant has this effect been? And what
military policies will (or should) they follow during the rest of this
century to share in a common defense?
Thinking more broadly, how much of the weakness of the dollar (and
the high price of gold) in recent years stems from loss of confidence in
the American military capability? What would be the effect on our trad-
ing partners, particularly our energy suppliers, if we failed to maintain
our position in nuclear and nonnuclear forces? Reasonable political
stability is essential to international trade, investment, credit, and. eco-
nomic growth. Hence, should not our foreign policy be more explicitly
focused on these matters? Can we get through the next decade without
military intervention in the Middle East? How do we cope with almost
certain nuclear proliferation to smaller countries, both friendly and un-
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I have no answer to these questions, but include them because I be-
lieve they are too often omitted in considering economic issues and must
certainly be included in a discussion of technological development in
relation to our domestic economy. There is no reason to believe that
technological changes in the military field will stop or slow down. On
the contrary, they are more likely to accelerate.
The Next Energy Transition
Few issues have been and will be more important to our domestic
economy and to the stability of the world economy than those related
to energy supply, utilization, and pricing. During the past thirty years
we have gone through an energy transition and during the next thirty
years we will go through another.
So much has been written and said (both sense and nonsense) about
energy in recent years that one is tempted just to skip it. Yet no serious
discussion of technological change and our domestic economy can prop-
erly omit energy.
Highly effective technology directly applicable to our major energy
issues (both those related to conservation and supply) has been devel-
oped during the postwar period. We have the scientific and engineering
foundation for significant and much needed improvements in our energy-
related technology during the next several decades. Although necessary
to a successful energy transition, technology per se is not the real issue.
Petroleum-related technology has flourished during the postwar period,
but the most startling development is the extent to which our nation has
failed to use other available and applicable technology in addressing our
major energy needs for conservation and supply and early development
of new energy-efficient products. This situation developed in part be-
cause economic incentives for its use have been minimal, and disincen-
tives to its use have been actively promoted; and in part because of
largely exaggerated fear of unwanted side effects. The failure to permit
the price mechanism to function has been particularly noteworthy.
The major energy issue is whether our political, social, and economic
institutions (and those of other nations) have the strength and flexibility
to adapt to the institutional changes needed, especially those needed to
achieve a reasonable definition of the common purpose and the means
to work effectively toward achieving it. As the leading industrial nation
in the world, one would expect leadership from the United States in this
effort.
If man can be defined as "a tool-making animal with foresight" then
we have surely failed the test. Even if we make the essential high priority
effort to conserve energy and reduce its use per unit of output, energy
supply will continue to be central to the growth and efficiency of all
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energy problems and those of other nations has been regarded as vital
to controlling inflation, vital to our national security, essential to eco-
nomic growth and increased productivity, necessary for protecting our
environment, and the only way to achieve a productive and stable for-
eign policy. If those reasons aren't motivation enough, a few more rea-
sons to pull ourselves together could easily be added.
In the energy field, technological change has been slower than needed,
to the detriment of our domestic economy. Future economic growth and
improvement in our productivity will depend heavily on stimulating
wider and more rapid use of advanced technology in energy.
A Second Industrial Revolution
Developing like a storm during the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s,
and now ready to burst forth during the next thirty years is "a second
industrial revolution." Its full dimensions are still unclear, but there is
no doubt that its scope and power, already highly significant both to our
domestic economy and to the world economy, will grow enormously in
the years ahead.
The first industrial revolution was heavily based on mechanical engi-
neering in providing tools, machinery, and new sources of power to
replace human labor. The second, now developing, is based on a num-
ber of concurrent technological changes in the fields of communications
and information processing.
Much has been said about the dramatic changes in these fields, but
their effects may still be understated. Impressive advances have been
taking place simultaneously in a wide range of interrelated technologies,
which put together multiply their potential effects on economic develop-
ment. These interrelated technologies include, listing just a few: tran-
sistors, integrated circuits, LSI, microprocessors, VLSI; compact and
readily accessible data storage of massive capacity; computers, large
and small; digital communication switching and signal processing; ad-
vanced programming languages and highly sophisticated programs; sat-
ellites as communication stations; audio-visual sensing and displays;
word processing and voice coding; optical communication; highly intel-
ligent terminals; and electronic printing. Parallel advances in all of these
related aspects of communications and information processing have cre-
ated an explosion of possible applications.
The 1960s and early 1970s were characterized by a buildup of very
large central computing capacity; the late 1970s and 1980s have been
and will be characterized by widespread distribution of computing power
via communication links to a large number of remote locations, spread
through all parts of the economy. Driven by dramatic improvements in
performance and very large reductions in costs, there has been an almost
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in industrial, financial, government, professional, and educational insti-
tutions. (As an example of the dramatic cost reduction, a small com-
puter using a few microprocessors and selling today for about one
hundred dollars can outperform a large computer selling for over one
million dollars fifteen years ago. Roughly similar cost reductions have
occurred in related equipment and systems. By way of perspective, if a
corresponding reduction had been made in the price of a Cadillac, you
could buy one today for a few dollars.)
In addition to creating new markets and a wealth of new products
which have given a boost to economic growth, this new field has made
significant contributions to improved productivity. It will be important
to our international competitive posture, and a continuing large invest-
ment will be needed to maintain our current leadership in these new
technologies.
In one sense, synthetic electronic intelligence is being produced and
used to extend man's brain—if you like labels, consider "intellectronics."
One of the particularly interesting effects of this technology on our econ-
omy arises from its potential for both positive and negative effects on
how institutions of various types are managed. You heard some com-
ments earlier on some of the negative effects as related to government
intervention in our economy. On the positive side, there is a large poten-
tial for improving the productivity and profitability of business institu-
tions by effectively using communications and information processing
technology. Most studies of productivity underestimate, in my view, the
differences in productivity attributable to management skill.
Conclusion
In the context of worldwide political, social, and economic issues,
technological change has had a major impact on the domestic American
economy during the postwar period and will continue to have a major
impact during the next thirty years.
Sound political and economic policies which encourage economic
growth, savings, investment, and price stability have high leverage in
stimulating technological progress and focusing it on improving produc-
tivity and on new markets, products, and related new job opportunities.
Among the most significant changes in the postwar American econ-
omy are those which increasingly bind our domestic economy to the rest
of the world and make it a more dependent subelement of the larger
and more powerful world economic system. This trend has been heavily
influenced by technological change. It is given added significance by
dramatic changes in military technology and in the relative military
strength of the United States and the Soviet Union during the postwar
period. It is vital to our national security and our economy that we
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development and production programs during the next decade. The
dangers arising from our failure to maintain a proper military posture
relative to the Soviet Union have been amplified by our failure to use
market incentives to stimulate the use of available technology in ad-
dressing our energy needs.
Phenomenal concurrent advances in a wide range of new technologies
in the fields of communications and information processing are leading
us into "a second industrial revolution" of major importance both to
our domestic economy and to the world economy. These changes will
reshape some major industries and have significant effects on produc-
tivity, on international competitive patterns, and on how both govern-
ment and business enterprises are managed. Technological change and
its effect on our economy should not be expected to slow down. On the
contrary, it is more likely to accelerate. Effective use of our scientific
and technological resources will be an important, and possibly a crucial,
economic issue for the period ahead.
3. David Packard
Productivity and Technical Change
In the two decades that reached from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s,
the United States had a healthy economy, characterized by rapid eco-
nomic growth and low inflation, and propelled by great technical prog-
ress. This technical progress helped general annual increases in produc-
tivity in excess of 3 percent and was a major contributor to the overall
well-being of the economy.
The economies of Europe and Japan recovered from the destruction
of World War II during this period, and by 1965 were growing and
achieving annual productivity increases even larger than those in the
United States; in the case of Japan alone, productivity was increasing
at annual rates of from 6 to 8 percent.
Since about 1970, the rates of improvement in productivity have de-
clined in the major industrial countries of the world, with corresponding
declines in the health of their economies from the robust decades follow-
ing the war. This serious deterioration in the well-being of the free world
economy has been of great concern to businessmen, economists, and
people in government at many levels. It is difficult to find much to be
said that has not already been said about the subject. Yet the problem
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is so important that it is imperative that the search for answers continue
and that action which will improve the situation be identified and under-
taken. It seems to be generally agreed among economic scholars, man-
agers, and government executives that improvement in productivity
would be helpful in reducing inflation and promoting economic growth.
The productivity of a business enterprise is determined by a number
of factors, but the prime influences are management and the application
of technological innovation.
Management plays a major role in determining the structure of the
organization, influences the quality of supervision, provides training for
the workers, and works to motivate employees. There can be signifi-
cant improvement in productivity from management-directed activity,
as shown by the range of productivity that can be measured between
well-managed and poorly managed enterprises.
While productivity gains can be made by management leadership that
encourages people to work harder and work smarter, technology is the
base of most major gains in productivity. The use of better tools, better
equipment, and better manufacturing processes is the only way produc-
tivity can be improved once management's contribution has been opti-
mized. Even with the handicap of poor management practices, better
tools, equipment, and processes will usually improve productivity.
It is not often that one finds a manufacturing facility completely
equipped with the latest and most productive tools, machinery, and
processes. In the first place, these expensive items are seldom replaced
as rapidly as better equipment becomes available. Depreciation policies
and inadequate capital generation often limit replacement. Sometimes
management strategy does not give the highest priority to productivity
improvement, perhaps because the incentives are not right.
Industrial productivity has been higher in Europe and Japan since the
war, in part, at least, because new plants employing the most modern
equipment were built to replace those destroyed during the war while
plants in the United States continued to operate with older, less produc-
tive equipment. Also, many of the industries in these countries were
playing a catch-up game.
Inflation, coupled with the government's traditional fiscal and tax
policies, have made the replacement of older equipment more and more
expensive and difficult, although the investment tax credit allowance is
a step forward. It is one of the few incentives left to industry to improve
productivity through new equipment. A more liberal depreciation policy
would also help in the more rapid replacement of older equipment,
although to be effective, management would have to place less emphasis
on short-term profits.
Nearly every enterprise could improve its productivity by the more
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ready available, but the greatest contribution clearly must come from
the acceleration of the discovery and the innovative application of new
technology. Technology is an important contributor to productivity in
areas beyond development of better, more effective equipment and pro-
cesses. Technology makes its most dramatic contribution to productivity
in the creation of entirely new products from which new business enter-
prises and entirely new industries develop.
The United States has had an outstanding record in being at the
forefront of new industry creation throughout the entire twentieth cen-
tury. Automobiles, aircraft, plastics and chemicals, electronics, commu-
nications, and computers are just a few examples of that leadership.
Whether the productivity gains that result from new industries based on
new technology are properly reflected in the indices we use to measure
productivity or not, each of these industries has given us a quantum
jump in productivity, however you choose to define it.
The creation of a new industry based on technology requires the
innovative application of scientific knowledge to do something that is
useful and that needs to be done. The process can involve innovative
application of old technology, but the most dramatic examples come
from the discovery of new technology. A recent example is the invention
of the transistor and related solid-state electronics technology, followed
by the development of large-scale integrated circuits.
This new technology has made possible the modern computer indus-
try. Thousands of new products and new business enterprises have been
generated in this multi-billion-dollar industry in which again the United
States was, and still is, in the lead. Computers have made a considerable
contribution to increased productivity throughout industry, although
there may be some debate about just how much. The industry itself has
achieved productivity gains estimated at 35 percent per year reflected in
lower prices and increased performance.
Two ingredients are necessary to make these quantum gains. One is
the discovery of new scientific knowledge. The other is the creation of
the proper environment, the incentives, and the resources to encourage
the innovative application of the new technology to something useful
that needs to be done. Both ingredients are necessary to support a pro-
ductive research and development endeavor.
We often discuss research and development without considering that
a very wide range of activities is involved. Research is generally consid-
ered to be the search for new knowledge, but more often it involves
gaining a better understanding of what is already generally known. De-
velopment generally means practical application of scientific knowledge
to produce new tools, new processes, and new products. Here, some-
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and thus no clear line can be drawn between research and development,
and indeed they are often linked together.
The worldwide bank of basic scientific knowledge is generally avail-
able to scientists and engineers of all nations through widespread publi-
cation. Good basic research work is done in the United States, nearly
every European country, Japan, and the USSR.
There are some restrictions on the availability of scientific knowledge
because of national security considerations, and there is some private
control of scientific knowledge, but neither is a serious impediment to
the general availability of new scientific knowledge. There is sometimes
an advantage to early, and presumably exclusive, access to new knowl-
edge, but is seldom lasts for long.
There has been considerable discussion recently about whether the
United States is falling behind in research and development (R&D),
but the discussion does not always make a distinction between the dis-
covery of new basic knowledge and the whole host of other activities
that goes on under the heading of R & D.
The number of patents issued is often used as an index of the level of
R&D, but only a few patents involve new basic knowledge. Most pat-
ents involve the use of existing technologies. The number of patents
issued may be a general indication of the country's scientific and engi-
neering activity, but this is not a good indication of the level or quality
of basic research.
We have by no means used up our basic scientific knowledge. How-
ever, common sense tells us we should try to add to scientific knowledge
at the same time we utilize what we have. It is never possible to predict
a scientific breakthrough to a new field of knowledge. Many times in the
past, knowledgeable people have proclaimed that science has already
discovered everything that can be discovered, but these forecasters of
the future of science have always been proven wrong. New scientific
knowledge will bring about the creation of new products and entirely
new industries in the future as it has in the past. Furthermore, the payoff
will be great, for new scientific knowledge is the cornerstone of technical
change. It will continue to contribute to productivity in the future, as it
has in the past.
The United States should consider new and more effective ways to
increase the level of R & D in domestic industry with particular empha-
sis on how to encourage a higher level of basic research by industry.
We should also look for ways to improve effectiveness of established
and continuing federally supported R&D.
One suggestion to encourage an increase in the level of R&D by
industry is to allow a federal tax credit for R&D. There is no doubt
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to increase the level of funding and activity. However, unless this credit
were established only for increases in R & D above previous levels, we
would find that the credit would be used to pay for a great deal of work
that would have been done anyway.
Since a substantial part of the cost of R & D is in the instrumentation
and equipment required, the investment credit might be increased by an
additional percentage, say 10 to 20 percent of cost for machinery and
equipment used in R & D. Faster write-off of equipment and facilities
used for R & D would also help. There would be some definition prob-
lems here, as there would be for tax credits for total or incremental
R & D expenditures, but I believe they would be manageable.
Total federal support for R & D is very large, but much of it is for
space and defense programs, health, and more recently, energy. These
expenditures have had only marginal effect on improving the productiv-
ity of the economy.
High-energy physics receives very large federal support, and so far
has had very little payout in the areas of productivity, although there
has been some. Most solid-state electronics R & D is now funded by
private sources, and here the payout in productivity has been tremen-
dous. It will continue to be large in the future. Increased federal funding
could be useful in this area, and, in fact, the Department of Defense has
plans to put more money into large-scale integrated circuit R & D.
I believe the entire Department of Energy program of support for
R & D should be reexamined to make sure all promising areas of basic
research are adequately funded. Here the program should be patterned
after the brilliant Office of Naval Research (ONR) program established
in 1946. This ONR program deserves a great deal of credit for keeping
the United States ahead of the world in many areas of technology. Fed-
eral support, through the ONR, made it possible for Stanford University
to create an outstanding program in electronics in the two decades after
the war. Important research work was done in high-frequency vacuum
tubes called traveling wave tubes and backward wave oscillators. Later,
major contributions to the field of solid-state electronics technology
were made at the Stanford laboratories. An outstanding faculty was
assembled and fine students were educated. Much of this research and
many of the students contributed to the impressive growth of new elec-
tronics companies on the San Francisco Peninsula. Stanford could not
have made these important contributions in electronics research and
education without the funding provided by ONR. The "Silicon Valley"
could not have happened without this federal support of Stanford Uni-
versity.
Federal funding of R & D should emphasize basic research, since it
has been shown that adequate funding of basic research in all promising
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ment, on the other hand, will be done better by the private business
sector.
The imaginative application of scientific knowledge to create new
products, new business enterprises, and new industries is called innova-
tion. The economic and social climate of the United States has fostered
innovation from the early days of the Republic. Yankee ingenuity it was
called in the nineteenth century. The combination of pioneering atti-
tudes, unlimited risk capital, incentives to innovate, and new technical
knowledge have always made up the magic formula for the development
of new products and the building of new industries, as well as produc-
tivity improvement in the old.
Serious questions are being raised as to whether pioneering attitudes
are disappearing in the United States: societal attitudes that advocate no
growth, claim big is bad, and express increasing dissatisfaction with the
material side of life, probably combine to foster the idea that increasing
productivity should not have a high priority on the list of human en-
deavors. The availability of risk capital has been reduced by federal tax
policy, and other government policies have reduced incentives and estab-
lished formidable hurdles in the path of technical innovation.
The changes in federal tax policy in 1970, which increased the capital-
gains tax, effectively dried up sources of risk capital for the establish-
ment of new technical enterprises in the United States.
A Small Business Administration study showed that new capital ac-
quired by small firms through public offerings of equity dropped from a
level of 548 offerings in 1969, which raised nearly $1.5 billion, to 4
offerings in 1975, which raised $16 million. Fortunately, the capital-
gains tax rate was reduced last year, and venture capital is again becom-
ing available for new and small business enterprises, where a great deal
of innovation takes place.
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, when a great many new elec-
tronics companies were established, the availability of stock options
caused many scientists and engineers to leave older established firms
and cast their lots with newly formed firms. If the firm became success-
ful, the rewards were great, for when the stock option was exercised,
the stock had considerable value. The gain was not taxed until the stock
was sold. The recipient could either hold the stock in the hope of further
gain or sell it and pay the tax from time to time as funds were needed.
This was important because innovative technical people almost always
had more freedom to use their expertise and ingenuity in a small firm,
especially when they had the great incentive of ownership participation.
This may account for the fact that in many industries small and medium-
sized firms have often been more innovative.
Congress, in an action to prevent what it thought was a tax loophole,
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had to sell the stock to pay the tax. To compound the problem, an SEC
regulation prevented the person from selling the stock for a considerable
time after it was received if the person involved had a management role.
In effect, stock options as incentives for technical people to follow their
pioneering spirit were largely eliminated. There is now an effort to re-
store the stock-option incentive, and to do so would restore an impor-
tant stimulus for technical people to undertake risky, but potentially
profitable ventures in newly established enterprises.
Productivity in older and larger established firms is influenced by
technical change in a somewhat different way. Such firms use many
engineers and scientists in developing new products, devising new pro-
duction methods, and designing better production equipment and tool-
ing. The ability of engineers and scientists doing this kind of work to
improve productivity has been seriously affected by the unprecedented
growth of governmental regulations since 1970. In many cases, technical
people have been required to spend much of their time dealing with
regulatory problems instead of doing the kind of engineering and scien-
tific work that would otherwise contribute to productivity improvement.
Governmental regulations, in fact, may be the largest and most impor-
tant factor in the decline of productivity in the United States. Regula-
tions have been a serious problem in every aspect of industrial expansion.
The nuclear power industry may represent the worst of this situation.
It should require from four to five years to design, build, and bring on
line a new power plant, but regulatory procedures have extended the
time required threefold. It now takes from twelve to fifteen years to
bring a new plant on line. We may reach the point where it will be
impossible to build a nuclear plant or any other major facility in the
United States because of excessive regulation.
Regulatory procedures are causing costly delays in even the most
noncontroversial projects. I am involved in building an aquarium on the
shore of Monterey Bay. Although everyone thinks it is a great idea, it is
taking a full year to get approvals from all of the agencies involved.
Ten years ago, only a month or so would have been required. It is Im-
possible to keep architects and engineers working productively in this
kind of a situation.
Regulations have seriously reduced the productivity of new-product
development in every industry. The introduction of new drugs has be-
come much more expensive and time consuming, and even in the devel-
opment of electronic instruments, which have few health and safety
problems, the regulatory agencies involved have increased development
time and cost.
The impact of government regulation on small or newly forming enter-
prises is even more serious. The Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration code book contains some twenty-eight thousand regulations,611 Technology and Productivity in the United States
and OSHA is only one of many, many regulatory agencies. It is utterly
impossible for an individual entrepreneur starting a new business to
know, understand, and deal with all of these regulatory matters and still
have any time or energy left to deal with the mainstream work of his
enterprise. It is not surprising that fewer new technically oriented firms
are being started today. What is surprising is that there are any.
We need to find a way to apply more commonsense judgment to
matters of regulation so that we can continue to preserve and protect
all the important things in our society . . . things like the environment,
individual dignity, and the freedom to innovate and produce.
From my experience, I have concluded that there is a significant de-
cline in productivity because of the changes in societal attitudes I have
already alluded to and also changes in managerial attitudes and policies.
Specifically, if management people were to develop a better appreciation
of the influence of technology on productivity, basic research would
receive more support in the private sector. If management people were
to put more emphasis on long-term performance instead of quarter-to-
quarter or even year-to-year results, better decisions that affect produc-
tivity would be made.
In conclusion, there are a number of things the federal government
can do to improve the productivity of our economy. The government
can and should give a higher priority to increasing productivity in every
action that is taken which has a significant impact on the economy. This
applies to tax policy, regulatory policy, and policies that affect federal
support of R & D.
I believe the private sector can and should do a better job as well.
I believe productivity would improve if managers were to place more
emphasis on long-term performance, as I mentioned earlier.
If both the federal government and the private business sector were
to give productivity a higher priority among all of their other concerns,
this would also influence the attitude of the general public. It would
help bring about a general realization that there can be no improvement
in the economic well-being of the average individual without an improve-
ment in the overall productivity of our economy.
I am convinced that, to the extent the importance of productivity
improvement to the welfare of the individual is understood and accepted,
a better climate for productivity will be established.
Summary of Discussion
A lively debate centered on the appropriate role of the federal govern-
ment in the area of research and development (R&D). Milton Fried-612 Edwin Mansfield/ Ruben F. Mcttlcr/David Packard
man saw an inconsistent attitude of businessmen in their views about
the government's role in R & D. On the one hand, they complain that
government regulation stifles R&D while on the other they ask for
special government favors for R&D, such as tax credits. Friedman saw
no reason why a tax credit on R & D matched by tax increases elsewhere
should be any more effective in raising productivity than an end to spe-
cial tax incentives and a general reduction of tax rates. Friedman dis-
puted the notion that a government role was appropriate for research
projects with long lead times. It is the market, and not the government,
he declared, which has the longer time horizon.
Arthur Okun held that the free market fails to reward adequately the
production of knowledge and therefore generates too low a level of
R&D. Orovernment subsidization of R&D (starting with patent laws
and grants for basic research) is an economically efficient response.
Friedman agreed that the free market is likely to be imperfect in gener-
ating R&D but suggested that so too is a system with a large govern-
ment role. It's a choice of two evils, he declared. Okun responded that
it would be remarkable if the "best" system were either all governmen-
tal or all private; some mix is inevitable.
Feldstein took issue with Friedman on targeted versus general tax
cuts for R&D: a general tax cut might stimulate R&D, but an equal
tax cut targeted on R & D should provide a larger stimulus. Friedman
answered by observing that the goal is not the stimulation of R & D but
of productivity growth. And for the latter goal, he argued, the tax issue
is unclear.
Edwin Mansfield shed some more light on the question of tax policy.
He noted that a good definition of "research" for tax incentive purposes
is very difficult to devise. Moreover, where other countries have at-
tempted to create tax incentives for R&D, the results, according to the
little evidence that is available, appear to have been small. He stressed
that very little is known about the effects of such programs and that
there is a need for much more economic research in this area.
Mettler and Packard cited a number of government-supported pro-
grams of basic research that have had significant beneficial effects on
technological development. Packard reiterated the favorable experience
of the Office of Naval Research.
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